We address the problem of the information-disturbance trade-off associated to the estimation of a quantum transformation, and show how the extraction of information about the a black box causes a perturbation of the corresponding input-output evolution. In the case of a black box performing a unitary transformation, randomly distributed according to the invariant measure, we give a complete solution of the problem, deriving the optimal trade-off curve and presenting an explicit construction of the optimal quantum network.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the key features of quantum theory is the impossibility of extracting information from a system without producing disturbance on its state, the only exception to this rule being the trivial case when the state belongs to a set of orthogonal states. A canonical illustration of the unavoidable disturbance caused by quantum measurements is Heisenberg's γ-ray microscope thought experiment [1] . The impossibility of a non-disturbing extraction of information is the working principle of quantum cryptography, whose security relies on the fact that any amount of information extracted by the eavesdropper causes a corresponding amount of disturbance that can be detected by the communicating parties. A quantitative expression of such information-disturbance tradeoff is a non-trivial issue because there are many different ways to quantify "information" and "disturbance", which have been put forward in the literature [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] .
All the scenarios analyzed in the past have one point in common: they concern the disturbance produced by measurements on quantum states. However, one can consider other scenarios where the measurements produce a disturbance on quantum transformations. For example, we may have a black box implementing an unknown transformation belonging to a set {E i }, with the restriction that the black box can be used only one time. On the one hand, we may try to identify the unknown transformation (that is, to find out the index i). On the other hand, we may want to use the black box on a variable input state. Clearly, in general the two tasks are incompatible: In this case there is a trade-off between the amount of information that can be extracted about a black box and the disturbance caused on its action. In other words, we cannot estimate an unknown quantum dynamics without perturbing it. Therefore, it is important to find a quantitative formulation of the information-disturbance tradeoff, and to find the optimal scheme that introduces the minimum amount of disturbance for any given amount of extracted information. Like the trade-off for states, the trade-off for transformations is relevant to the discussion of quantum cryptographic protocols where the secret key is encoded in a set of transformations, as it happens in the two-way protocols of Refs. [17] [18] [19] for finite dimensional systems, and in the protocol of Ref. [20] for continuous variables. Here for simplicity we will restrict our attention to the case of unitary transformations on finite dimensional quantum systems. Like in Refs. [7, 11] we will quantify the information gain and the disturbance with suitable fidelities, and we will derive the minimum amount of disturbance associated to any possible value of the information gain.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section II we introduce the problem and the notation. Section III then provides a brief review of the formalism of quantum combs and generalized instruments [21] [22] [23] , which is crucial in our paper. The complete analysis of the information-disturbance trade-off for arbitrary unitary transformations will be presented in Section IV: in particular, we will first give the rigorous mathematical formulation of the problem (Subsec. IV A ), the analysis of its symmetries IV B, the derivation of the optimal tradeoff curve (IV C), and, finally, the construction of the optimal network (IV D). We conclude the paper with a discussion of the results in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
In the case of states, the mathematical tool to analyze the information-disturbance trade-off is provided by the notion of quantum instrument. In the discrete-outcome case, a quantum instrument is a set of quantum operations (trace-decreasing completely positive maps) {T i } transforming operators on the input system Hilbert space H 0 to operators on the output system Hilbert space H 1 , with the normalization condition that T := i T i is trace-preserving (that is, it is a quantum channel ). A quantum instrument describes a measurement process that outputs the classical outcome i and the quantum state T i (ρ)/ Tr[T i (ρ)] with probability p i = Tr[T i (ρ)]. To derive our results we will use the generalization of the notion of instrument to measurement processes on quantum transformations, rather than on quantum states [21] [22] [23] . This extension will be presented in Section III.
In the following we will denote the linear operators on a Hilbert space H by L(H). We will make extensive use of the isomorphim between linear operators in L(H) and vectors in H ⊗ H given by
where {|n } is a fixed orthonormal basis for H. The isomorphism satisfies the property
T denoting transposition with respect to the fixed basis.
For the sake of clarity we will often use the notation H a,b to denote the tensor product H a ⊗ H b , A a,b to stress that A belongs to (H a,b ), and, similarly, |ψ a and |A a,b to stress that |ψ belongs to H a and |A belongs to H a,b . Using the Choi isomorphism [24] , we can associate each completely positive map
I 0 being the identity map on H 0 . In terms of the Choi operator, the condition that T is trace-preserving (resp. trace-decreasing) becomes
where Tr 1 denotes partial trace over H 1 . We now introduce the trade-off problem for quantum transformations. Consider a quantum network R with an empty slot that can be linked with a variable quantum device, the input-output action of the latter being described by a channel in the set {E i }. Ideally, we would like the network R to give us some information about the channel E i without affecting the output state E i (ρ) that the channel should produce when an input state ρ is fed in the corresponding device. (see Fig. 1 ). However, as already mentioned, this is not possible in general.
As we already mentioned, there are two extreme situations. On one extreme, if we are only interested in extracting information, the best strategy is to apply the channel on one side of a suitable bipartite state σ ∈ L(H o ⊗ H 0 ), thus getting the output state (E i ⊗ I 0 )(σ), and then to perform a suitable measurement {P j }. In
Given a black box implementing an unknown channel Ei drawn from a set {Ei}, we want to link it with a quantum network R that both gives an estimate j of the parameter i and affects the output state Ei(ρ) as little as possible (here the symbol ≈ means that the network R is optimized in such a way that the output of the two circuits on the left and on the right is as close as possible).
this case the available use of the channel is consumed for estimation: after this step, the best we can do to produce an output state close to E i (ρ) is to apply to the input state ρ some channelẼ j that depends on the outcome j of our measurement. On the opposite extreme, if we do not tolerate any disturbance, the only possible is to apply the black box to the input state ρ. In this case we correctly obtain the output state E i (ρ), but we have no measurement data to infer the identity of the unknown device. In the intermediate cases, it is important to assess the maximum amount of information that can be gathered without trespassing a given disturbance threshold.
Since the trade-off problem involves optimization of quantum networks, we will use the approach of quantum combs developed in [21] [22] [23] . This approach is based on the characterization of the most general transformations that quantum channels can undergo, and on realization theorems proving that all these abstract transformations can be implemented by quantum networks. Since our theorems are constructive, this approach will also provide the explicit form of the optimal quantum network.
III. QUANTUM COMBS AND GENERALIZED INSTRUMENTS
By stretching and rearranging the internal wires, we can give to every quantum network the shape of a comb. The empty slots of the network becomes the empty space between two teeth of the comb.
. . . Referring to Fig. 2 , each wire is labeled with a natural number, which is even for the input wires and odd for the output ones; the corresponding Hilbert spaces are labelled accordingly.
If our network consists of a sequence of N quantum channels (trace-preserving maps), then we call it deterministic. To every deterministic network we can associate a positive operator R (N ) ≥ 0, called quantum comb, satisfying the normalization condition [21, 23, 26] 
where
, is the comb of the reduced circuit obtained by discarding the last N − k teeth.
The normalization condition of Eq. (5) reflects the causal ordering in the deterministic network. We will call a comb satisfying Eq. (5) deterministic, and we will denote by DetComb(
H i ) the set of all deterministic combs with the given ordering of the input and output spaces. A deterministic quantum comb with N = 1 is simply the Choi operator of a quantum channel: in this case the condition of Eq. (5) is equivalent to the normalization of the channel given in Eq. (4). Accordingly, DetComb(H b ⊗ H a ) will be the set of (Choi operators of) quantum channels from
This framework of quantum combs can be easily extended to the case of networks consisting of quantum operations (trace-decreasing maps). We call probabilistic comb a positive operator S (N ) ≥ 0 that is bounded by some deterministic comb, that is, an operator S (N ) with the property
We will denote by ProbComb(
k=0 H k ) the set of all probabilistic combs with given ordering of the input and output spaces. A probabilistic comb with N = 1 is simply the Choi operator of a quantum operation: in this case the condition of Eq. (6) is equivalent to the bound in Eq. (4). Accordingly, ProbComb(H b ⊗ H a ) will be the set of (Choi operators of) quantum operations from
Two quantum networks R (N ) and S (M) can be linked together by connecting some wires of R (N ) with some wires of S (M . Let us denote by J the set of wires that are connected and by K (L) the set of wires of R (N ) (S (M ) that are not. The circuit resulting from the connection, denoted by R (N ) * S (M) , has Choi operator given by the link product
where R (N ) , S (M) are the Choi operators of R (N ) and S (M) , respectively, and T J denotes the partial transposition with respect to the fixed orthonormal basis of Eq.
(1). For example, let E be a channel from H 0 to H 1 and F be a channel from H 1 to H 2 ; then the Choi operator of the composition F E is
As a particular case for H 0 ≃ C, if ρ is a state on H 1 and E is a channel from H 1 to H 2 one has
A deterministic (probabilistic) quantum comb, besides representing a quantum network with some empty slots, can also represent a quantum channel (operation) R
is in one-toone correspondence with the comb R (N ) . In the following two subsections we will exploit this correspondence to discuss the physical realization of quantum combs, both in the deterministic case (subsec. III A) and in the probabilistic case (subsec. III B).
A. Realization of deterministic combs
The following theorem, proved in Ref. [27] , gives an explicit construction for the realization of every deterministic quantum comb as a sequence of isometric channels.
Theorem 1 (Realization of deterministic combs) Every deterministic comb can be realized as a concatenation of isometric channels in the following way:
. . . . . .
where A k is an ancilla with Hilbert space 
where H k ′ ≃ H k and T m←n is the teleportation operator from H n to H m , given by T m←n = k |k m k| n .
Note that the isometry V [k] defined in Eq. (11) has the correct input and output Hilbert spaces. Indeed, for k = 1 one has R (0) = 1 and the isometry V [1] , given by
as stated by the thesis.
B. Generalized N-instruments
In the discrete-outcome case, a generalized Ninstrument is a set of probabilistic combs {R i } ⊂ ProbComb(
When N = 1 the notion of generalized instrument coincides with the usual notion of quantum instrument. Every N -instrument can be realized as a quantum network, due to an analogue of Ozawa's dilation theorem [29] . The proof of the dilation theorem for generalized N -instruments was originally presented in Ref. [23] , and is combined here with Theorem 1. 
In our study of the information-disturbance tradeoff we will use generalized 2-instruments, which can be graphically represented by combs with two teeth and one empty slot where the unknown black box can be inserted, as in Fig. 1 . Since the value of N is fixed to N = 2, in the following we will drop the index (N ) in R and simply write R i and R.
IV. INFORMATION-DISTURBANCE TRADEOFF FOR UNITARY CHANNELS

A. Formulation of the problem
Suppose that a black box performs an unknown unitary channel U(ρ) = U ρU † , where the unitary U ∈ SU(d) is randomly drawn according to the normalized Haar measure dU . Let H 1 ≃ H 2 ≃ C d be the input and output Hilbert spaces for the unknown channel, respectively. In order to extract information we will then use a quantum network like that of Eq. (12) with N = 2. The network will be the described by a generalized 2-instrument {RÛ }, the outcomeÛ ∈ SU(d) being the estimate of the unknown parameter U . For every possible outcomeÛ , RÛ is an element of ProbComb(
, and one has the normalization condition
which is the continuous version of Eq. (12) . Since there will be no ambiguity, from now on we will omit the domain of integration SU(d).
When the unknown black box with channel U is connected to the quantum network with generalized instrument {RÛ }, one obtains a set of quantum operations RÛ * U, each corresponding to a possible result of the measurement. However, to speak about the "the probability of the outcomeÛ " we need to know what input state ρ is fed in the circuit: we cannot speak of the "probability of a quantum operation" without specifying its input state. If the input state is ρ ∈ L(H 0 ), then the probability is given by the trace of the output state (RÛ * U)(ρ):
where we used the link product of Eq. (7) and Eq. (9) to compute the Choi operator of RÛ * U and the action of the channel RÛ * U on the state ρ, respectively. We also used the fact that A T = A * for every self-adjoint operator.
To quantify the information gain and the disturbance we now introduce two suitable fidelities. Suppose that the black box performs the unitary channel U and that the measurement outcome isÛ . In this case we quantify information gain with the fidelity
Note that the maximum value of the fidelity is 1, and is achieved if and only ifÛ = ωU for some phase |ω| = 1, that is, if and only if the two unitary channelsÛ and U coincide. The fidelity g(Û , U ) enjoys the invariance property
Averaging the fidelity with the probability of the estimatê U given the true value U and the input state ρ, we then obtain the average information gain
In our analysis we will always assume that the input state is given by ρ = I/d. The reason for this choice is that the condition ρ = I/d arises in two relevant scenarios:
1. when the input system (wire 0) of the circuit is prepared in a maximally entangled state with some reference system 0 ′ . This is the case in the cryptographic protocols of Refs. [17, 19] (and, in the infinite energy limit, also in in the continuous variable scenario of Ref. [20] ).
2. when the input system is prepared at random in one of the states of an ensemble {ρ i , p i }, with the property that i p i ρ i = I/d. This is the case of the cryptographic protocol of Ref. [18] .
Since we are setting ρ = I/d, we will drop the subscript ρ in G ρ . Using Eqs. (15) and (16), the expression for the information gain G is
We now introduce our figure of merit for the minimization of the disturbance. To this purpose, we consider the channel fidelity [28] between the overall quantum operation RÛ * U performed by the network and the input channel U. This is the fidelity between the two output states produced by the two operations RÛ * U and U when applied on one side of the maximally entangled state |Φ = 1 √ d |I 0,0 ′ . In terms of Choi operators, the channel fidelity is given by
where we used the fact that, by definition of Choi operator (Eq. (3)), one has (E ⊗ I)(|Φ Φ|) = E/d for every quantum operation E. Averaging over the outcomes and the true values we then obtain the average fidelity
Note that the fidelity F naturally arises also in the case where the input state at the wire 0 is a pure state ϕ = |ϕ ϕ| chosen at random according to the uniform measure on pure states: in this case the fidelity between RÛ * U(ϕ) and U(ϕ), averaged over ϕ, U , andÛ , is given by
having used the relation
and the normalization T r[R] = d 2 , which follows directly from Eq. (5) in the N = 2 case with
Since there is a trade-off, the information gain G and the fidelity F cannot achieve their maximum values at the same time. Therefore, we will introduce a weight 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 that quantifies how much we care about information extraction versus disturbance minimization, and our figure of merit will be the convex combination pG + (1 − p)F . The extreme case p = 0 and (resp. p = 1) corresponds to the situation where we do not tolerate any disturbance (resp. where we are only interested in extracting maximum information). The trade-off curve obtained by the maximization of pG + (1 − p)F for all possible values of p ∈ [0, 1] is the same curve that would be obtained by maximizing F for given G (i.e. by finding the minimum disturbance for given amount of extracted information), or by maximizing G for given F (i.e. by finding the maximum amount of extractable information for given disturbance threshold).
B. Symmetry of the estimating network
Here we exploit the symmetries of the figure of merit pG + (1 − p)F to simplify the optimization problem. The crucial simplification comes from the following Theorem, which states the symmetry properties of the optimal generalized instrument:
Theorem 3 (Symmetries of the optimal instrument) Let G and F be the information gain and the fidelity defined in Eqs. (19) and (20) . For every p ∈ [0, 1], the generalized instrument that maximizes pG + (1 − p)F can be chosen to be covariant, that is, of the form
Moreover, the operator Ξ satisfies the commutation relation
Proof. The proof is based on the same argument used for the proof of Lemma 2 in Ref. [25] . Consider an arbitrary generalized instrument {RÛ }. Using the invariance of the Haar measure and of the fidelity g(Û , U ) (Eq. (17)), it is easy to check that the values of F and G in Eqs. (19) and (20) do not change if each RÛ is replaced by the group average
where V ,V * , W, W * are the unitary channels corresponding to the unitaries V, V * , W, W * , respectively. Note that {R ′Û } is still a generalized instrument, because it satisfies the normalization condition of Eq. (14) . Moreover, from Eq. (24) is is clear that Ξ := R ′ I satisfies the commutation relation of Eq. (23). Finally, from Eq. (24) it is also clear that for everyÛ , V, W ∈ SU(d) one has
′Û is of the form of Eq. (22) . Since the substitution {RÛ } −→ {R ′Û } can be done for every generalized instrument, in particular it can be done for the optimal one.
Using Theorem 3, we can now express the normalization condition of Eq. (14) in a particularly simple way. Indeed, Eqs. (22) and (23) imply that the normalization operator R = dÛ RÛ satisfies the commutation relation
The Schur lemma then implies Tr
for some positive operator R (1) ∈ L(H 1 ⊗ H 0 ), and Tr 1 [R (1) ] = αI 0 for some positive number α ∈ R. Therefore, the normalization condition for R to be a deterministic comb (Eq. (5) for N = 2) becomes trivially
C. Optimal trade-off curve
Exploiting Theorem 3 and the Schur's lemmas we can now rewrite the figure of merit as:
where Λ G and Λ F are the positive operators given by
|I I| being the projector on the onedimensional invariant subspace of V ⊗ V * . Since the only restrictions on Ξ are positivity and the normalization given by Eq. (25) , the optimal choice is to take Ξ proportional to the projector on the eigenvector of pΛ G + (1 − p)Λ F corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue; up to normalization, this eigenvector the can be shown to be of the form [11] 
In order to satisfy Eq. 
The normalization of χ implies that x and y obey the quadratic equation
Note that in the above equation there is just one free parameter (either x or y), which can be expressed e.g. as a function on the trade-off ratio p. Fidelity and gain can be calculated in terms of the parameters x and y, thus getting the following expressions
The extreme situation of minimum disturbance (resp. maximum extraction of information) can be retrieved in the extreme case x = 0, y = 1 (resp. y = 1, x = 0). Indeed, when x = 0, y = 1, one has RÛ = |I I| 3,2 ⊗ |I I| 1,0 for allÛ . In this case, there is no information extracted and one has RÛ * U = U, that is, the instrument realizes the identity map. Accordingly, the fidelity F reaches its maximum F = 1, while the information gain takes its minimum G = 1 d 2 , the value achieved by a random guess according to the Haar measure. In the opposite case x = 1, y = 0 one has instead RÛ = |Û Û | 3,0 ⊗ |Û * Û * | 2,1 , which implies
. This means that in this case our circuit performs the optimal estimation of U [25] , and then executes the transformationÛ on the input state. Accordingly, the fidelity drops to its minimum value F = 
2 and F max = 1. Note that I = 0 (D = 0) corresponds to no information (no disturbance) and I = 1 (D = 1) corresponds to maximum information (maximum disturbance).
Using Eq. (32) and the definitions of I and D it is immediate to obtain the relation
Substituting the above equation in the normalization condition of Eq. (31) we finally obtain the curve of the optimal trade-off:
D. Optimal quantum network
We now use Theorems 1 and 2 to construct explicitly the optimal network achieving the trade-off of Fig. 3 . The optimal network will be derived for every possible value of the parameters x, y with 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1 belonging to the curve x 2 + y 2 + 2xy/d = 1. Since x and y can
The corresponding plot is showed in Fig. 3 . (33)), our construction provides the optimal network for very point in the optimal trade-off curve depicted in Fig. 3 . According to Theorem 2 the generalized instrument {RÛ } is implemented as a sequence of N = 2 isometries V [1] : H 0 → H 1 ⊗ H A1 and V [2] : H 2 ⊗ H A1 → H 3 ⊗ H A2 , followed by a measurement {PÛ } on the ancilla A 2 . The ancillary Hilbert space [2] are obtained from the realization of the deterministic comb R = dÛ RÛ (Theorem 1) and the ancilla measurement is given by the POVM
Let us start from the construction of the isometries. By explicit calculation we find
Taking the partial trace on H 3 and using the condition
we then obtain
and, therefore,
According to Eq. (11), the isometry V [1] :
If we input a pure state |ψ ∈ H 0 the output is then the superposition
Intuitively, we can understand the action of V 1 as a superposition of two different processes:
1. with amplitude y the quantum state |ψ 0 is propagated undisturbed from the input system 0 to the output system 1, so that the unknown unitary U can act on it. As we will see in the following, the maximally entangled state
|I 1 ′ ,0 ′ will then serve as a resource to teleport the state U |ψ 2 to the output node 3.
2. with amplitude x the state |ψ 0 is transferred to the ancillary degree of freedom 0 ′ : in this case the unknown unitary will not act on it, but, instead, it will act on the maximally entangled state
As we will see in the following, the state |Φ U 2,1 ′ will be used for the optimal estimation of U . Finally, the state |ψ 0 ′ will be transferred to the output system 3, and, depending on the estimate, a transformationÛ will be applied on it.
On the other hand, using Eqs. (35) and (30) the POVM {PÛ } on H A2 can be written as
Combining the isometry V [2] with the POVM {PÛ } we then obtain the instrument {TÛ }, with TÛ :
We now use Eqs. (38) and (39) to show that the instrument {TÛ } has a very simple form. To construct TÛ explicitly we start from the Kraus form TÛ (ρ) = KÛ ρK † U , where the Kraus operator KÛ is given by y |ψ 1 |I 1 ′ ,0 ′ + x|I 1,1 ′ |ψ 0 ′ which is tuned by the parameters x = √ D and y = √ 1 − I, whose value depend on the information-disturbance rate. After that, the unknown unitary U is applied between the nodes 1 and 2 of the network. Finally, a Bell measurement is performed and, depending on the result, the unitary transformationÛ is performed on the output system 3.
The action of the whole network is depicted in Fig. 4 .
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we addressed the fundamental problem of the information-disturbance trade-off in the estimation of an unknown quantum transformation. In particular, we completely solved the problem in the case of a unitary transformation, randomly distributed according to the Haar measure.
Interestingly, the analytical expression of the optimal trade-off curve given in Eq. (34)) happens to coincide with the trade-off curve for the estimation of a maximally entangled state [11] . Note, however, that this is not a trivial consequence of the Choi isomorphism U → 1 √ d |U : while this mathematical correspondence is one-to-one, operationally it cannot be inverted with unit probability. In other words, once the transformation U has been applied to the maximally entangled state
|I , it is irreversibly degraded, and can be retrieved only probabilistically. For this reason, there is no operational relation between the information-disturbance trade-off for unitary transformations and that for maximally entangled states (none of them is a primitive for the other). Indeed, the optimal quantum network for unitary transformations depicted in Fig. 4 is quite different from the optimal network for maximally entangled states. In our case the optimal network consists of i) a first interaction that produces a quantum superposition with amplitudes depending on the desired informationdisturbance rate and ii) of a Bell measurement followed by unitary feed-forward.
Besides its fundamental relevance, the informationdisturbance trade-off for transformations is also interesting as a possible eavesdropping strategy in cryptographic protocols where the secret key is encoded in a set of unitary transformations, as it happens in the twoway protocols of Refs. [17] [18] [19] [20] . Notice, however, that for protocols where the secret key is encoded in a set of orthogonal unitaries, like those of Refs. [17, 18, 20] , the security of the protocol is not based on the informationdisturbance trade-off studied in this paper. Indeed, since the unitaries are orthogonal, they can be estimated and re-prepared without introducing any disturbance (or just introducing a vanishing disturbance, in the infinite dimensional case). This is the reason why the protocols of Refs. [17, 18, 20] necessarily require the random switching between a communication mode and a control mode. The present analysis is instead relevant for the analysis of the two-way protocol of Ref. [19] , which uses two mutually unbiased bases of orthogonal qubit unitaries, given by B 1 = {σ µ } 1, 1 ). In this case, using the optimal network is a non-trivial eavesdropping attack. Of course, since the protocol does not involve all possible qubit unitaries, the optimal trade-off curve for the restricted set B 1 ∪ B 2 could possibly be more favourable to the eavesdropper than the universal trade-off curve derived in this paper. The analysis of the trade-off for non-universal sets of unitary transformations and the study of the relations between information-disturbance trade-off and quantum cloning for unitary transformations [19] are interesting directions of future research.
